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 1.  Introduction: Market driven versus regulatory unbundling 
 
In competitive markets the optimal degrees of bundling or unbundling of com-
plementary components within a value chain result endogenously, depending on 
the cost and demand characteristics. The stronger the demand for one-stop-
shopping of different product components and the stronger the synergy effects 
of bundling different product components into one end product, the lower the 
incentives for unbundling.  
 
Bundling products can be frequently observed. There is typically a demand for 
complete cars, rather than individual components like the engine, wheels, or 
driving system. Bundling products are often the results of consumer preferences. 
But there are also viable markets for consumers to buy individual components of 
the value chain separately and assemble some complementary components 
themselves. The huge success of do-it-your-self stores is an obvious result of 
such unbundling strategies. The degree of bundling versus unbundling of prod-
ucts in competitive markets results endogenously, depending on consumer prefe-
rences and production conditions. The focus of the markets is therefore not sole-
ly on avoiding interfaces between different product components per se, but on 
preventing the atomizing of the value chain into an artificially high number of 
interfaces. Not everything that is technically feasible is also economically bene-
ficial. The definition of interfaces between different product components is a 
genuine entrepreneurial decision. In particular, the supply of a subset of compo-
nents of a value chain requires viability without losses.  
 
The question of economic incentives for bundling products versus unbundled 
components has to be differentiated from the incentives for vertical integration 
versus vertical separation. The latter is focused on firm organization. Several 
technically separable functions of a firm are executed by one entrepreneurial 
unit or by different firms. In contrast, the issue of bundling versus unbundling is 
focused on the product, where several technically separable components are 
produced as one product or as separate components. A vertically integrated en-
terprise can also produce unbundled products, leaving some components for fi-
nal assembly by the consumer. And vice versa, a vertically separated firm may   2 
offer a bundled product by ordering some components from other firms and sell-
ing the end product to the customer under its own brand name. 
 
For the case that individual components of the value chain cannot be sold direct-
ly to the end consumer, a firm can produce a subset of components by itself and 
buy the remaining components as inputs. These make-or-buy decisions lead to 
some interesting questions from an organizational perspective. However, they 
do not raise concerns from a regulatory policy point of view (Knieps, 2008, pp. 
238 ff.).  
 
In network industries end-consumers’ services are provided by means of com-
plementary components of a value chain, which may be offered via different 
submarkets. For example, letter mail conveyance is provided by the components 
of collecting, sorting, transport and delivery. Electricity systems consist of gen-
eration, transmission networks and regional/local distribution networks and the 
resale activities. Railway systems consist of railway traffic, railway traffic con-
trol and railway infrastructure. Telecommunications is differentiated in terminal 
equipment, telecommunications services, satellite/mobile networks, long-
distance cable-based networks and local cable-based networks.  
 
The basic idea behind the disaggregated approach to network regulation is to 
identify those parts of networks where network specific market power can be 
localized, which may be abused in the interconnection process between different 
submarkets of the value chain. The focus of regulatory unbundling concepts is 
the set-up of transparent interfaces between those parts of networks with market 
power and the complementary competitive parts. The goal of regulatory unbun-
dling is to guarantee non-discriminatory access to the areas where network spe-
cific market power exists. Since the global entry deregulation of the telecommu-
nications industry in 1998 there has been an ongoing debate on the proper role 
of regulatory unbundling resulting in various forms of unbundling. The regulato-
ry obligations to offer individual network elements or subparts of networks at 
regulated prices may entail unbundling between telecommunications services 
and infrastructures, unbundling between long distance networks and local net-
works and different forms of unbundling within local telecommunications net-  3 
works. Local loop unbundling may consist of direct access to copper cable (full 
unbundling), the obligation to lease a copper line (line sharing) or bitstream-
access-services. 
 
The goal of this paper is to provide a network economic analysis of the concept 
of regulatory unbundling in the telecommunications industry. Due to its dynam-
ic nature, and the increasing importance of competitive subparts, the telecom-
munications sector provides particularly interesting insights for studying regula-
tory unbundling. In section 2 the localization of network specific market power 
by means of the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks is introduced, resulting in a 
generalization of the essential facilities doctrine. In section 3 the fallacies of 
overregulation by undue unbundling obligations are indicated. Neither the pro-
motion of infrastructure competition by mandatory unbundling of competitive 
subparts of telecommunications infrastructure, nor regulatory induced network 
fragmentation within monopolistic bottleneck components is justified. In section 
4 the impact of the shrinking of the areas of network specific market power on 
the remaining unbundling regulation is analyzed. Section 5 concludes, pointing 




2.  Regulatory unbundling and non-discriminatory network access 
 
2.1  Localization of network specific market power  
 
In order to determine the interface between the parts of networks with market 
power and the competitive parts of networks, network specific market power has 
to be localized. It is important to note that the underlying characteristics of net-
work structures are not sufficient to guarantee market power. The markets for 
network services are far from the ideal picture of perfect atomistic markets. For 
example, an essential characteristic with respect to the supply of train services is 
its network structure. For train companies incentives may exist for bundling traf-
fic either on a given line (economies of scale) or in serving several lines jointly 
(economies of scope). However, a possible lack of competition between active   4 
firms in the market in a particular area with low population density could be re-
placed by efficient potential competition. The same argumentation also holds for 
other network service providers, for example airline companies, bus companies, 
telecommunications and postal service providers. If the incumbent companies 
produce inefficiently or make excessive profits, market entry by newcomers will 
take place. 
 
The pressure of potential competition can create incentives for the active suppli-
er to improve the quality and variety of services as well as to produce more  
efficiently. These networks are therefore called contestable (Baumol, Panzar,  
Willig, 1982).  An essential condition for the functioning of potential competi-
tion in order to discipline firms already providing network services is that the 
incumbent firms do not have asymmetric cost advantages with respect to poten-
tial entrants. In fact, trains, like planes or busses, do not need to be considered as 
sunk costs. They can be used to serve other networks in different locations once 
demand in the former network has dropped too far to keep up a profitable train 
service. Other examples for contestable networks are the markets for telecom-
munications services.  
 
An important condition for the effectiveness of potential competition is, howev-
er, that all (active and potential) suppliers of service networks have equal (sym-
metric) access to the complementary infrastructures. As long as a train company 
has preferred access to rails and stations (e.g. if there is congestion) or has ad-
vantages with respect to scheduling procedures, it possesses competitive advan-
tages with respect to potential entrants and active competitors. The same holds 
for airline companies having preferred access to landing rights, or telecommuni-
cations service providers having preferred access to local telephone networks.  
 
When a natural monopoly situation (due to economies of scale and scope) arises 
in combination with sunk costs, so that entry and exit are not free, a monopolis-
tic bottleneck with network specific market power emerges (Knieps, 1997). A 
natural monopoly exists when a single provider is able to serve the relevant 
market at lower costs than several providers. Sunk costs are no longer decision 
relevant for the incumbent monopoly, whereas a potential entrant is confronted   5 
with the decision whether to build its own network infrastructure and thereby 
incur the irreversible costs. Therefore, the incumbent firm has lower decision 
relevant costs than the potential entrants. This creates room for strategic beha-
viors of the incumbent firm in such a way that inefficient production or exces-
sive profits do not automatically result in market entry. Natural monopolies   
together with irreversible costs are characteristic for the construction of trans-
portation infrastructures such as railroads and airports. Consider, e.g. a domestic 
railroad operator supplying rail capacities and simultaneously rail transport ser-
vices as all national railroad companies do. The railroad operator may exploit its 
monopoly position vis-à-vis a foreign rail transport company and restrict access 
to its own market. Monopolistic bottlenecks can also be observed in local infra-
structures for gas, water and electricity, as well as for telecommunications.  
 
Network infrastructure, however, need not always create network specific mar-
ket power. Firstly, the natural monopoly situation may disappear, as for example 
in long-distance telecommunications transmission with parallel transmission 
lines. Secondly, technological change may provide alternative network infra-
structures, such that monopolistic bottlenecks are losing importance. Examples 
are the increasing relevance of cable-less local mobile communications and the 
increasing relevance of cable television networks for telecommunications   
purposes. Therefore, a clear-cut distinction between network infrastructure as 
monopolistic bottlenecks and competitive networks is not always easy to find. 
Careful sector studies seem inevitable.  
 
 
2.2  The essential facilities doctrine and unbundling regulation 
 
An adequate starting point for government interventions when market power is 
involved in interconnection/access processes seems to be the essential facilities 
doctrine. Well known and often applied in the US antitrust law, the essential fa-
cilities doctrine has gained increasing importance also in the European competi-
tion law. The focus is on access to an essential facility on equal terms for all 
competitors. It is through the application of the Sherman Act of 1890 that the 
essential facilities doctrine has developed in the US. Liability under the essential   6 
facilities doctrine is based on the following criteria: control of an essential facili-
ty by a monopolist (endowing monopoly power); a competitor’s inability practi-
cally or reasonably to duplicate the facility; the denial of the use of the facility to 




It is obvious that the preconditions of the essential facilities doctrine are not  
fulfilled in the case of interconnection/access among competitive networks,   
because competitors always possess access to alternative (potential) networks. If 
an incumbent carrier were to foreclose access or behave in other aspects in a 
non-competitive way, new network providers would arise automatically (inde-
pendent of the market share of the incumbent carrier). The application of the 
essential facilities doctrine to interconnection /access among competitive net-
works would even be detrimental, because it would artificially restrict degrees of 
freedom in the search for pareto-optimal bargaining solutions among the market 
participants.  
 
As a consequence, the essential facility doctrine should be applied in a restric-
tive manner only to those interconnection/access cases where market power (at 
least on one side) is involved. In the US antitrust law the essential facilities doc-
trine has been applied in a case-by-case procedure to specific infrastructures 
(e.g. terminal railroads, local electricity network of a municipality). In spite of 
the purpose of the essential facility doctrine to restrict monopoly power, inter-
pretations of this doctrine by different US courts have varied over time. One 
controversial issue was, whether the feasibility of providing infrastructure ca-
pacities to a competitor would be an absolute criterion or whether “valid busi-
ness reasons” would be a rationale for a refusal to deal with a direct competitor. 
This quite elusive interpretation can easily be criticized because, obviously, the 
fact that granting access would reduce the profit of the owner of the facility can-
not by itself constitute a “valid business reason” (Tye, 1987, p. 346). 
 
                                                 
1   City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co., 995 F. 2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 
1992).   7 
An effective application of the essential facilities doctrine must be combined 
with an adequate regulation of access conditions (quality and tariffs). Partly, this 
requirement has been included in the criteria of the essential facilities doctrine 
itself. Not only the denial of the use of the facility but also the imposition of re-
strictive terms for the use of the facility with the consequence of substantial 
harm to competition has been considered in earlier case law as a criterion for the 
essential facilities doctrine. Nevertheless, a significant scope for interpretation 
remains, especially given the historical fact that antitrust lawyers are typically 
not specialized in dealing with complex matters of access conditions. 
 
As a consequence, enforcement of the essential facilities doctrine should be 
combined with the application of regulatory instruments focusing on access 
conditions (especially regulation of interconnection/access charges). Another 
advantage of the explicit combination of regulatory concepts with the antitrust 
concept of the essential facilities doctrine is the shift from case-to-case applica-
tions towards the definition of a class of cases characterized as monopolistic bot-
tlenecks. In contrast, the rather global concept of the abuse of market power by 
dominant firms requires that the relevant market has to be established (in a   
narrow sense) and that the meaning of dominance has to be clarified (George, 
Jacquemin, 1990, p. 228). Nevertheless, a generalization of the concept of the 
essential facilities doctrine seems possible focusing on the class of cases where 
market power is based on the same reasons. Within networks, this leads to mo-
nopolistic bottleneck infrastructures. 
 
The reference point for regulatory rules concerning interconnection/access 
charges should be the coverage of the full costs of the monopolistic bottleneck 
in order to guarantee the viability of the facility. In particular, when alternatives 
to bypass essential facilities are absent, the cost-covering constraint may not be 
sufficient to forestall excessive profits. Therefore the instrument of price-cap 
regulation should be introduced (Beesley, Littlechild, 1989). Its major purpose is 
to regulate the level of prices, taking into account the inflation rate (consumer 
price index) minus a percentage for expected productivity increase. In contrast, 
the design of pricing structures should be a part of the decision making process 
of the firms. It is important to restrict such price-cap regulation to the monopo-  8 
listic bottleneck parts of networks, where market power due to the monopolistic 
bottleneck is really creating a regulatory problem. Regulation of interconnec-
tion/access conditions should be strictly limited to those parts of networks where 
market power has been localized. In competitive subparts of networks the price 
setting should be left unregulated.  
 
 
3.  Promoting infrastructure competition by regulatory unbundling? 
 
Since the abolishment of legal entry barriers the question of how regulatory pol-
icy can influence incentives to invest for incumbents and entrants has led to the 
issue of mandatory unbundling at regulated access prices (Farrell, 1997; Haus-
man, Sidak, 2005, pp. 189 f.). It was later considerably transformed by the con-
viction that “the way to promote infrastructure competition is to make available 
easy and inexpensive access to the assets of the incumbent which are not replic-
able. At the outset this might include a large numbers of assets, which initially 
are complements to the entrant’s investment, but with time become substitutes.” 
(Cave, 2003, p. 16).
2
 
 This concept immediately makes room for a large variety 
of regulatory discretion with respect to unbundling and access pricing regimes in 
order to encourage competitive infrastructures. The ladder of investment ap-
proach either results in an oversized regulatory basis, when the unbundling of 
competitive subparts of telecommunications infrastructure is made mandatory, 
or in undue regulation of monopolistic bottleneck infrastructures, thereby de-
stroying the advantages of the natural monopoly with subsequent inefficient 
cost-duplication (Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007, pp. 260 ff.).  
The regulatory goal of applying the ladder of investment approach is to guaran-
tee an opportunity for entrants of gaining access to unbundled network compo-
nents at any place of their choice, so that the identity of the non-replicable com-
plementary assets varies with the nature of the entrant’s strategy. This might be 
achieved through a decision by the regulator to prescribe time-variant access 
                                                 
2   The idea of the ladder of investment was already indicated in Cave, Prosperetti, 
2001, p. 421. For the context of narrowband see Cave, Vogelsang, 2003, p. 724; for 
the context of broadband see Cave, 2006, pp. 231 f. and Cave 2010.    9 
pricing principles under which the prices of certain network resources are initial-
ly low, even below cost and therefore cross-subsidized, and then rise over time 
according to the regulator’s preference for network duplication. Thus, it is main-
ly up to the regulator when and to what extent inter-platform competition can 
emerge. 
 
If, according to the business models and subsequent make-or-buy decisions of 
the competitors, some resources are not replicable, this does not mean that they 
already fulfill the characteristics of a monopolistic bottleneck. Firstly, competi-
tive components may also belong to the ladder of investment. When entrants are 
starting their business activities with reselling services, they may consider com-
petitive  long-distance infrastructure components as non-replicable, claiming 
mandatory access at subsidized access charges. Competitive components are 
also involved in bitstream access, for example the provision of DSLAM equip-
ment. Due to the low investment that entrants are assumed to make initially, 
they suffer from low service flexibility compared to a network operator. Thus, 
according to the ladder of investment approach, entrants are starting their busi-
ness activities by reselling services/elements, that are on  the one hand not 
aligned with huge investment activities, but lead on the other hand to low ser-
vice flexibility in comparison with the degree of freedom of a network operator. 
In fact, it is assumed that assets cannot unambiguously be classified in catego-
ries that are easily, with difficulty, or not at all replicable (see figure 1).  
 
Secondly, monopolistic bottlenecks are to be regulated as a whole, focusing glo-
bally on the relevant infrastructure characteristics as natural monopolies. Within 
monopolistic bottlenecks the network owner’s business model should be rele-
vant. The network owner should provide non-discriminatory access to monopo-
listic bottlenecks at cost-covering prices. If regulatory unbundling of certain   
bottleneck components at subsidized access charges is applied, incentives for 
excessive investments are created, ignoring the relevance of the viability of the 
existing infrastructure. Instead of regulating monopolistic bottleneck as a whole, 
the corresponding facilities are split up and concomitant economies of scope de-
stroyed. Thus the viability of network facilities is threatened.  
   10 
 
Figure 1:   Layout of the ladder of investment approach  
   (Source: Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007, p. 262).   
 
 
4.  Regulatory unbundling and shrinking monopolistic bottlenecks  
 
The markets for telecommunications services are important examples for   
competitive networks. The market for public telephone services is competitive, 
because suppliers of value added services are also prepared to offer telephone 
services. Even if market shares of incumbent firms are large, inefficient suppli-
ers would be immediately confronted with rapidly decreasing market shares. 
Nevertheless, competitive subareas can also be localized in the area of telecom-
munications infrastructure. The pressure of potential competition in wireless 
networks, for example satellite or microwave systems, is guaranteed as long as 
symmetric access to complementary inputs, for example right of way, radio 
spectrum etc., is ensured. In the meantime, long-distance telecommunications 
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As long as network specific market power may exist in the local infrastructure 
network due to the absence of alternative network infrastructures, the question 
arises what the remaining bottleneck components on the upstream markets are 
depending on the required transmission qualities in the relevant service markets 





Figure 2:   Shrinking monopolistic bottleneck  
     (Source: Blankart, Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007, p. 426) 
 
 
For narrowband services like PSTN/ISDN, the components belonging to the 
monopolistic bottleneck are local switch facilities, copper loops, ductworks and 
ducts. In order to provide DSL services, access to copper cable rather than local 
switch facilities is necessary. Competing providers can implement alternative 
upgrading strategies, for example, upgraded copper cable by DSLAMs. Modems 
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large scope of innovative network services, parallel investments in modems 
cannot be regarded as socially inefficient cost duplications. 
 
The provision of VDSL services requires investing in fiber-to-the-curb or fiber-
to-the-home. In order to apply upgrading strategies by means of fiber cable, 
access to ductworks and ducts is necessary. Rather than a duplication of duct-
works, fiber cables can be laid between relevant points in existing ductworks of 
local telecommunications networks. Competing upgrading strategies by means 
of fiber cables and other upgrading components are feasible on the basis of ducts 
and ductworks. In addition, ducts and ductworks from electricity or water com-
panies may also be available.  
 
Ex ante regulation of access to ducts and ductworks is required, if alternative 
infrastructures for end customers (e.g. interactive broadband cable) are not in 
place; and if alternative duct networks, which can be upgraded for VDSL pur-
poses at reasonable cost, are not available. A differentiated unbundling and con-
comitant incentive regulation is required, consisting of an accounting separation 
regime, in combination with price cap regulation. Only then may alternative car-
riers become active in upgrading investments (e.g. fiber and modems) in order to 
provide VDSL services. 
 
It is important to realize that the competence for network design should always 
remain with the network operator. On the basis of the essential facilities doc-
trine, regulators cannot force a network operator to build a new network, up-
grade an established network or rebuild a network (e.g. to remove switches or 
copper loops). This shows that the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks is capable 
of dealing with concerns regarding the dynamic development of telecommunica-
tions, although the criteria for localizing network-specific market power possess 
similar validity for other (stationary) network sectors. Criteria for defining 
where network-specific market power still exists do not depend on the emer-
gence of new markets for telecommunications services. However, the market 
dynamics of service markets inevitably lead to a shrinking of the monopolistic 
bottleneck within the local loop. 
   13 
5.  Outlook: Phasing-out unbundling regulation in Europe 
 
A distinction needs to be made between those kinds of networks industries 
where the monopolistic bottleneck characteristics tend to be relatively stable 
over time (e.g. electricity grids or rail networks) and dynamic network industries 
where monopolistic bottleneck characteristics tend to constitute a transitory 
phenomenon due to the development of technology. The telecommunications 
sector, where extensive phasing-out potential had already been expected with 
the onset of market liberalization, provides a key example in this respect. In the 
meantime, the development from narrowband to broadband communications has 
already significantly shrunk the monopolistic bottleneck areas. 
 
European telecommunications regulation is a clear example of how a vague reg-
ulatory mandate can systematically lead to overregulation. In 2002, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council passed a Framework Directive and an Access 
Directive that failed to map out the precise extent of future market power regula-
tion. As a result, the EU Commission has the competency, by means of guide-
lines, to specify a large number of markets where the introduction of sector-
specific regulatory provisions should at least be considered. The markets which 
the Commission classified as potentially in need of regulation included service 
markets such as international and domestic telephone calls, leased lines and 
transit services that are undoubtedly competitive. Where substantial market 
power is established, the national regulatory authorities are practically required 
to take over these markets under pressure of the Commission’s right of veto. The 
EU Directives have been an ideal breeding ground for varied forms of discretio-
nary intervention, depending on the particular influences of the interest groups 
involved (Knieps, 2005).  
 
In the meantime, the institutional process regarding the phasing-out of economi-
cally unfounded regulation has made significant progress. In particular, the   
European Commission (2007) removed several competitive markets from the 
list of markets regarded as in possible need of regulation. Nevertheless, there 
still remains some scope for overregulation (Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2010).  
   14 
Ex ante regulation of access to ducts and ductworks (physical access remedies) 
is required, if alternative broadband infrastructures for end customers are not in 
place, and alternative duct networks, which can be upgraded for VDSL purposes 
at reasonable cost, are not available. What may, however, be called the bitstream 
regulation fallacy is that additional remedies may be imposed, including regula-
tion of broadband bitstream access (European Commission, 2010, recitals 36 
and 37). To maintain the market for bitstream access in the list of markets in 
possible need of sector-specific regulation implicates double regulation and 
therefore overregulation.  
 
Nevertheless, the bandwagon towards the phasing-out of European telecommu-
nications regulation is gaining speed. In contrast to other network industries, the 
shrinking of monopolistic bottlenecks and the increasing relevance of competing 
access infrastructures leads to an irrevocable transition of the European tele-
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